I.A. Sergievskiy
The article is based on archival sources, examines the key features of the production and military acceptance of the first 3-line Mosin rifle model 1891, made at the French Chatellerault plant in 1894–1895.
This article is dedicated to the time-proven domestic weapon: the 3-line model 1891 rifle, the famous Mosin. The rifle is still used by independent security forces of the Ministry of the Interior and in paramilitary formations in Asian and African countries.
The Mosin rifle was accepted into service in 1891. The Russian rifle won in the heated battle between rifles produced by L. Nagant and S.I. Mosin. The acceptance commission decided in favour of the Russian 3-line rifle mainly due to the fact that it was simpler and therefore cheaper to produce.
It was assumed that Russian industry could independently rearm the Russian army, but during a meeting chaired by War Minister P.S. Vankovsky it was decided that in order to rearm the army as quickly as possible 503,000 units should be ordered at the Chatellerault factory in France. No one doubted that the bulk of the rearmament would be performed by domestic factories, but it was interesting to produce a batch in a foreign factory as a part of the manufacturing setup process. This decision also had a political side, as a Franco-Russian military alliance was made in 1891 and an order for the newest Russian rifle in France was a visible demonstration of this newfound friendship.
The French Arsenal Chatellerault (Manufacture d’armes de Châtellerault) was not chosen by accident. It was founded in 1819 as a producer of bladed weapons and later retooled to produce small arms and artillery. Chatellerault developed and produced the famous French Lebel model 1886 rifle. By the end of the 19th century Chatellerault was one of the leading small arms producers in France.
A commission was formed by the Russian War Ministry to accept rifles at the French factory. The commission consisted of Colonel N.A. Sokerin (chair), Captain I.A. Savostyanov, Staff-Captain Prince A.G. Gagarin, Staff-Captain V.I. Giber von Greyfendels, Staff-Captain A.I. Kholodovsky (figs. 1 and 2). All of them were well known small arms specialists. Colonel N.A. Sokerin was the chair of the commission that approved the final blueprints of the 3-line rifle in 1891. Captain I.A. Savostyanov was one of the developers of the 7.62mm cartridge for the Mosin rifle. Prince A.G. Gagarin was also a respectable scientific authority, who by that time was already famous thanks to a number of inventions in the field of artillery and engineering. A.I. Kholodovsky, who performed the calculations of the ballistics of the 3-line rifle, as well as V.I. Giber von Greyfendels were experienced acceptance representatives of the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU). Both later occupied key posts in the domestic defense industry. Russian military agent Baron L.A. Fredericks also helped the commission in France.
Fig 1. Members of the Russian acceptance commission are presented to the leadership of the French Chatellerault factory.
Fig 2. Members of the Russian acceptance commission. Left to right: Colonel N.A. Sokerin, Staff-Captain Prince A.G. Gagarin, Staff-Captain A.I. Kholodovsky, and Baron L.A. Fredericks.
The acceptance commission operated in 1894-1895. It performed acceptance of rifles, ammunition, and ammunition crates. Rifles were broken up into batches of 800-900 units. It took several days to accept a batch and as a rule multiple batches were tested in one day. 500-1500 rifles would be accepted daily.
The Russian commission identified a number of features that were characteristic of early stages of producing a new item. Let us examine the most typical among them.
Early on, 9-36 rifles out of one batch (about 900 rifles) produced at Chatellerault were rejected, about 1-4%. This was an acceptable rate, as the provisional instructions estimated a 6% rejection rate.
Fig 3. A Russian model 1891 rifle produced at the Chatellerault factory in 1893.
One of the main indicators of the quality of a rifle is its precision and stability of the mean point of impact. This parameter was very carefully checked during acceptance of Mosin rifles at Chatellerault. “Firing the first one hundred rifles in batch #473 revealed 8 rifles with unsatisfactory accuracy. All 8 rifles had deviations to the right. As before, there were no rifles with unsatisfactory precision. The mean point of impact was 5-6 cm to the right for all 100 rifles. Firing the next hundred rifles in that batch, some from a bench and some from the shoulder, showed the same tendency to skew right.” As such, the rifles in this batch had satisfactory precision, but unsatisfactory accuracy. The commission wrote that “inspection of the tools that check the correctness of the aiming line showed a miscalibration that led to an incorrect setting of the sight post to the left. Measures were taken by the factory to correct this, but the recalibration of tools will take time, therefore a part of the rifles will be delivered as before with sight posts installed too far to the left.” This defect was not critical and could be easily corrected by calibrating the sights.
By mid-1894, after half a year of work, the percentage of defective barrels was radically reduced to no more than 1% of any batch. Some batches had no rejections at all. Of course, Chatellerault was interested in increasing quality, as Russia did not pay for rejected rifles.
Production of small arms is a difficult technological process. Meeting tolerances is an important part of this process. For instance, General Ye.Z. Barsukov, a well known expert in the field of artillery production, stated that contracts should be given to military factories and not civilian ones, who “do not consider it necessary to concern themselves with one thousandth of an inch, let alone fractions of it”.
The acceptance commission at Chatellerault noted in September of 1894 that the deviation in the barrels of 27 rifles out of the last batch was 0.160” or 0.4064mm, while the acceptable deviation was no more than 0.158” or 0.40132 mm. According to the provisional acceptance instructions, the quality of the barrel was of the utmost importance. However, trials showed that this deviation was acceptable and the rifles were permitted to be sent to Russia.
The issue of interchangeable parts is an important one in small arms. Interchangeable parts are necessary for production in large volumes and also to increase the ease of repairs. S.I. Mosin paid close attention to this principle when creating his rifle. Requirements for interchangeable parts also applied to rifles produced at Chatellerault. Chatellerault tried to stamp most parts of the 3-line rifle to make assembly easier. However, no stamps were applied to the hammer of the rifle at first. Later on Chatellerault asked the acceptance commission to change the location of the stamp on the feeding lever, as its current location led to “the formation of burrs that must be manually filed down”. It is important to note that the French factory “avoided all hand work in principle due to the expense of hand work compared to mechanical work”.
Gun steel, a special steel alloy with high elasticity, is the most important component in small arms production. Compared to normal steel, it is more difficult and requires more precision to produce. In August of 1894 the director of Chatellerault asked the Russian commission to permit the use of springs produced from an unapproved brand of steel. However, the commission pointed out that when this steel was used, the rejection rate increased to 8% per batch, greater than the acceptable 6%. The argument was settled with a decision to “subject the finished springs to separate trials, where failed ones will be discarded”.
Difficulties were not only encountered with the weapons themselves. In the same August of 1894 the commission rejected 28 out of 100 rifle butt plates in one batch. After a request from factory management, “the commission inspected the plates and found that the blisters and veins on the metal were only on the surface. Polishing removed them completely without taking the plate out of tolerance.” The cause of these defects was a difference between the Lebel and Mosin rifles. The Lebel rifle was made from lower quality steel and its lifespan was lower than that of the Russian 3-line rifle. A rifle like the Mosin was a technological novelty for the French factory.
Our research shows that the design of the Mosin rifle continued to improve even after the acceptance of the 1891 design “at the highest levels”, during the work at Chatellerault in 1894-1895. For example, “for some time the cutoffs-deflectors provided by the Chatellerault factory broke or slumped even in finished rifles that had already been tested and accepted. To solve this issue, craftsman Ignatovich hired by the commission proposed a new type of cutoff-deflector where the spring would break under maximum pressure as opposed to the part itself. The same craftsman improved the design of the hammer catch, as the mechanism produced by Chatellerault had a tendency to periodically break and the trigger action was either too heavy or too light and insufficiently smooth. Ignatovich’s hammer catch had neither of these defects. Representatives at Chatellerault commented that production of the improved parts “turned out to be easier than production of the existing hammer catch and cutoff-deflector”. Note that this craftsman took part in the competition for a new bolt action rifle that Mosin ended up winning.
The Russian military commission did not just accept rifles, but also crates, ammunition, and bayonets. Both Russian and French-made ammunition was used. The latter was produced at Gevelot, a pioneer in the creation of the primer. Its creation survives to this day without substantial changes. It is worth noting that the Russian commission preferred Russian ammunition. However, the effectiveness of Russian ammunition was somewhat lower than that of European ammunition. This was shown in trials of 3-line rifles where “when firing Russian ammunition the mean point of impact deviated to the right by 6 cm on both benches, which was not the case with French ammunition”. In trials held during January of 1895, trials of a batch of Mosin rifles with French ammunition revealed tearing of the cupronickel cartridge casings. 37 instances of tearing were found out of 500 shots. The commission turned to the manufacturer, the Gevelot factory. Russian ammunition, which had a lower muzzle velocity, did not have this defect. In February of the same year, out of a batch of 10,000 French rounds 8% showed a “bullet weakly seated in the casing”, although this did not impact the quality of shooting. A French officer responsible for the practical trials of Russian rifles insisted that French ammunition was preferable to Russian despite its drawbacks, as its muzzle velocity was higher. A month later Gevelot was still unable to correct the tearing issue. An order from the head of artillery at the Russian acceptance commission was made for 50,000 rounds produced by another French manufacturer, the French Ammunition Society.
Acceptance of bayonets was performed in the following fashion. A bayonet was mounted on a rejected barrel and dropped from a height of 60 cm. The commission was unsatisfied with the quality of bayonets by mid-1894, noting that “the factory does not take any measures to replace their bayonet steel and does not take any measures to correct cracks in bayonets presented to the commission that can also occur in bayonets in Russia”. This defect was later corrected by means of improving the quality of steel used in bayonets.
The topic of crates that rifles were stored in was no less important. The commission was very demanding when it came to the crates as it ensured the safety of the rifles as they were transported to Russia. The same high requirements applied to ammunition crates. The Russian commission was unsatisfied with the quality of crates provided by Gevelot and developed its own type of crate produced abroad.
The work of the commission was not without unforeseen events. For instance, in June of 1894 a ship carrying rifles to Russia sank and 29 crates with rifles were submerged in water. The rifles were deemed repairable, but “having inspected the crates, the commission came to the conclusion that the walls were so permeated with salt water that it would be impossible to reuse them for carrying rifles, as they would rust. The commission decided to order new crates and sell the wet ones at an auction, having marked them with a rejection stamp to prevent further use of these crates to carry rifles.”
The main component of the trials was practical shooting. Many organizational questions arose during shooting at Chatellerault. For instance, in January of 1895 Russian GAU specialists in France came to the conclusion that “neither the contract nor the provisional instructions for acceptance of the 3-line rifle give directions on how to calibrate the rifles: from a bench or from the shoulder. According to the rules of French arms factories, rifles were calibrated on a bench to compensate for issues with individual marksmen. However, the Russian commission considered the benches used at the French factory to be unsatisfactory. As a result, Chatellerault developed two completely new types of benches that were used to test Russian rifles.
In early 1894 the commission raised the issue of disposing of packaging from spent ammunition, “crushing it so its initial shape cannot be restored”. By the middle of the year the factory accumulated a great deal of wooden ammunition crates, French and Russian cartridge casings, zinc liners, etc. With permission from the GAU, the commission sold these byproducts on the French market.
Overall, Chatellerault successfully completed the Russian contract in 1894-1895. 503,539 rifles were made. The factory took on the Russian contract without any other work, as rearmament with Lebel rifles was completed and the French army was not intending on making any new orders soon. According to French research, Chatellerault expanded the ranks of its personnel from 2000 to 6000 to meet Russian demand. At the start of 1895 president of the Third Republic Jean Casimir-Perier inquired with the Russian War Minister “with the question of whether your War Ministry is satisfied with the rifles ordered at Chatellerault that have already been received and whether it intends to continue making orders in France or already has all necessary means to produce the required number of rifles in Russia?” The French leader wanted to know because “a significant number of workers who are busy making your rifles could be out of work any day”. To this, General of Infantry P.S. Vannikov replied that further production is planned at domestic factories. Before returning to Russia, the commission took care of destroying all tools and instruments, blueprints and copies, as well as rejected products. The Russian War Ministry understood the need to keep the secret of their 3-line rifle.
This was not the end of the cooperation between Russia and France in the area of small arms. According to military historian Yu.N. Leschenko, French specialists from the Chatellerault arsenal helped set up production of Mosin rifles at Russian factories, including the Tula arms factory.
Rearmament of the Russian army with the Mosin rifle was complete by 1903. By this point 1,777,805 battle rifles and 28,875 rifles for training had been built at Tula, 428,327 and 5649 respectively at Sestroretsk, 1,142,969 and 17,419 respectively at Izhevsk. In total, domestic factories gave 3,401,044 battle rifles, which combined with 503,589 battle rifles produced at Chatellerault makes a total of 3,904,633 rifles. The French arsenal contributed 13% of the total number of battle rifles, a significant contribution to the rearmament of the Russian army.
As a gesture of gratitude, during his visit to France in 1896 Emperor Nikolai II made the decision to gift the city of Chatellerault a bell produced in Russia. The bell was delivered to Chatellerault in 1897. It was blessed on May 15th of the same year and officially named Alexandre Nikolas, although the French most often refer to it as the “Russian bell” (cloches russes). The bell was produced in St. Petersburg at the then famous V.M. Orlov bell factory. Since then, the cloches russes rings for important events in the city of Chatellerault.
Fig 4. The delivery of a Russian bell to the city of Chatellerault. 1897.
For example, on October 5th, 1919, the bell rang to announce the return of the 32nd Infantry Regiment from the Great War, which was raised in this area. In 1944 it greeted British and French soldiers who liberated the city from German occupation. It rings to this day for important events and regular services.
As a result of studying the specifics of production and acceptance of 3-line rifles at Chatellerault in 1894-1895, one can make the following conclusions:
- The condition of Russian military industry did not allow for rearmament to be completed quickly. This required placing an order at a leading European arms factory: Chatellerault.
- The technologies used in producing the Russian rifle were new for French industry. Several difficulties arose during production to satisfy the Russian order. Nevertheless, the order was successfully completed, accepted, and shipped to Russia.
- Russian military specialists from the acceptance commission completed their objective. They did not only carry out acceptance of the products but made a significant contribution to the improvement of the Mosin rifle and discovered specifics of setting up mass production.
- The order for 3-line rifles was a significant one for French military industry. This order gave the Chatellerault a second wind and created additional jobs. The labour of French workers was recognized by the Russian government as signified by the bell that survives in Chatellerault to this day.
Gallery of the Chatellerault factory mark on a three-line rifle, 1893.
RUSSIAN-FRENCH MILITARY-TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE CHATELREAU ARSENAL
I.A. Sergiyevskiy
Franco-Russian Military Technical Cooperation in the Second Half of the 19th Century at the Châtellerault Arsenal
The present mutual sanctions between the European Union and the Russian Federation eliminated military technical cooperation between the two entities. In part, the mutually beneficial ties between France and the Russian Federation were severed. The most famous contract of those annulled was the construction of Mistral assault ships for Russia. Today it is difficult to imagine that the renewal of military technical cooperation between the Fifth Republic and Russia is possible.
In this situation, it might be interesting to examine instances of successful military technical cooperation between France and Russia in the past. The most widespread and production cooperation between the two nations in the aforementioned area took place in the late 19th century, particularly after the signing of the Franco-Russian alliance in 1891. This alliance was the predecessor of the Triple Entente.
This publication examines key moments of the military technical cooperation between the two nations using the example of the Châtellerault arsenal (Manufacture d’armes de Châtellerault). The article is based on previously unpublished documents from the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA), State Archive of the Tula Oblast (GATO), Central State Archive of the Udmurt Republic (TsGA UR), Archive of the Zlatoust Municipal Okrug (ZGO Archive), Archive of the Military Historical Museum of Artillery, Engineering, and Signals (VIMAIViVS Archive) as well as other sources and literature.
Progressive French armament was of interest to Russian military minds for a long time, especially its production at one of France’s leading factories, the Châtellerault arsenal. From the 14th century, Châtellerault was one of the main arms production centers in France. A special state arsenal was founded there by royal decree in 1819. Its initial specialization was in bladed weapons, but closer to the middle of the 19th century it began to produce firearms. This was linked to the transition from flintlock rifles to percussion caps among Western European nations.
The Russian Empire fell behind in this very important step in rearmament, largely due to the expense of reconfiguring its factories for a new type of firing mechanism. A new smoothbore percussion gun for infantry was accepted into service in 1845. At the same time, work began to convert earlier flintlock weapons to use percussion caps. This resulted in a transformation of the Russian weapons industry.
The commander of the 6th Artillery Division Lieutenant General N.O. Sukhoznet (representing the army) and member of the Committee of improvement of long guns and carbines Colonel V.G. Glinka inspected the Tula weapons factory in 1847. Their report to the War Ministry told of “significant rates of rejection due to unavoidable deviations in hand finishing” and stressed “the necessity of introducing mechanical devices” to help with production of percussion rifles. The members of the commission suggested purchasing rifles at the Châtellerault arsenal. The inspectors agreed that it was necessary to send officers abroad for “acquiring information on improvements to arms production that are useful and even necessary”.
The proposal made by N.O. Sukhozanet and B.G. Glinka was approved in October of 1847 and at a meeting of the Military Council of the Russian Empire it was decided to “purchase six automatic mills as used at Châtellerault at the cost of 60 francs each through the French industrialist Malbec and subject them to trials at our factories”.
This task was entrusted to the head of the Russian Mission in Paris, N.D. Kiselev. In late 1847 he replied that the purchase will have to be delayed as “one of the automatic mills used at Châtellerault burst and there is now an investigation into measures to prevent this occurrence”. The French Revolution of 1848 impeded Russian plans to buy equipment from Châtellerault. Nikolai I had a negative reaction to the “Springtime of Nations” and the two nations severed their diplomatic ties. The French ambassador left St Petersburg and N.D. Kiselev remained in Paris only as a private citizen. The Military Council decided to cancel the order for automatic mills.
Despite the cooling of the relationship between the two nations after the rise of Napoleon III in power and the argument on the “Eastern question” that led to the Crimean War (1853-1856), Russia’s interest in French weapons persisted. At the very height of the war July of 1855, a sample of the Thouvenin rifle was captured “as used by all petty officers in zouave regiments”. The rifle was passed on to the experimental workshop at the Tula arms factory and subjected to detailed study.
Russian agents arrived in France with the goal of “studying the design of rifle factories, production, equipping the army with small arms, and training soldiers to shoot” as soon as the war ended. They visited factories in Saint-Étienne, Mutzig, Tulle, Châtellerault, and the Vincennes marksmanship school. Russian officers did not just visit it, but also went through a two-month internship. Russian specialists agreed that the French model of artillery and small arms manufacturing would be most appropriate to follow in the reformation of Russian arms manufacturing following the defeat in the Crimean War. As further research shows, the principles of organizing production and acceptance processes at Russian arms factories were based on the experience of French factories while taking into account specifics of Russian organization of production.
Not only firearms were studied, but also bladed weapons. In late 1857 in accordance with orders of Emperor Alexander II the Staff of the Head of Artillery purchased two samples each of “cuirasses, backswords, cavalry and dragoon sabers, fascine knives, and pikes, made from cast steel at the Châtellerault arms factory […] for comparing them with weapons produced in our factories.” Samples of the weapons were handed over to the Department of Mountain and Salt Affairs of the Ministry of Finance which transferred them to the Zlatoust arms factory “to perform comparative trials with weapons produced at the factory from Colonel Obukhov’s cast steel”.
Samples of French weapons produced at Châtellerault were only delivered to Zlatoust in the spring of 1858. The delay was caused by the need to wait for rivers to become navigable, after which they were delivered to the Urals “with a shipment of medication”. Workers of the Zlatoust factory began comparative trials in May of 1858.
Trials included both regular and harsh tests. The first category included a standard flex test, “forceful strike against the side of a wooden cone”, “chopping of dry hardwood in three swings”. Harsh tests included “bending on an Austrian machine and chopping a 2 line (0.5 cm) thick iron sheet”. Trials of the cuirasses consisted of “firing a soldier’s rifle from 20 sazhen (42 m)”. However the distance was shortened to 10 sazhen (21 m) since Russian cuirasses easily passed this trial and the French ones would as well.
Results of the trials showed that bladed weapons made at Châtellerault and at Zlatoust passed both regular and harsh trials with insignificant differences in performance. The weapons were of similar quality. This was largely achieved as a result of domestic production of a new type of high quality cast steel proposed by known metallurgist and manager of the Zlatoust factory P.M. Obukhov.
In turn, France was also interested in cooperation with Russia and viewed it as a potential market for military goods. In 1859 the Châtellerault factory’s representative Enthoven proposed its services to the Russian government as a “supplier of pistols for officers of the 1st Army”. It is important to add that this proposal was seriously considered by the Russian military but did not achieve the required support. It can be seen that the cooperation of the Russian War Ministry and the Châtellerault arsenal had many precedents, and so yet another deal with the Third Republic was nothing out of the ordinary.
As it is known, in the fierce competition held in 1890-1891 between the Belgian L. Nagant and Russian S.I. Mosin, the preference was made in favour of Mosin’s rifle. In April of 1891 the Mosin rifle was accepted into service in Russia.
The political situation at the time supported the decision made at a meeting chaired by the War Minister P.S. Vannovskiy to place an order for just over 500,000 rifles in France. Of course, none of the Russian specialists doubted that the bulk of rearmament would be carried out by Russian factories. Nevertheless, an order abroad was very beneficial from the standpoint of establishing production of a new rifle. In a memo dated August 23rd, 1890, even before any rifle was officially accepted into service, P.S. Vannovskiy reported to Emperor Alexander III that “given the current exchange rate, these rifles will be hardly more expensive than ones produced at our factories, but the very presence of a contract guarantees our interests.” This decision had a political aspect, as a Franco-Russian alliance was signed in 1891 and the production of a Russian rifle in France was its embodiment. This was indicated by the Assistant Chief of the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) Lieutenant General P.A. Kryzhanovskiy in his memoirs. He took a direct part in the commission to rearm the Russian army with the model 1891 rifle.
The French, as represented by Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Ribot, guaranteed the priority of the order placed at Châtellerault. The contract for production of 3-line rifles at Châtellerault was signed on December 19th, 1891, between French contractor A. Treille and Russian representatives N.I. Chagin (member of the GAU Artillery Committee) and Baron L.A. Fredericks (Russian military agent in France). According to the contract, the contractor accepted the production of 500,000 Russian rifles at the cost of 59 francs (25 rubles) apiece within 37 months.
Other French companies aside from Châtellerault took part in the order. For example, production of ammunition for calibration trials was given to Gevelot, crates and packaging for the rifles to Le Marchan, and instruments were produced at Bruno Hofmark. The French naval agency Dodiardi transported finished goods from Châtellerault to Dunkirchen by train and from there to Revel by sea. As Baron L.A. Fredericks reported, “the agency previously recommended itself highly”.
Acceptance of rifles produced at Châtellerault was done by members of a special acceptance commission called to aid the Russian military agent in France. Its members were well known specialists in the art of weapons: Colonel N.A. Sokerin (chair), Captain I.A. Savostianov, Staff-Captains Prince A.G. Gagarin, V.I. Giber von Greyfendels, and A.I. Kholodovskiy.
According to the contract, “Russian artillery officers are permitted at the factory while the order is being completed. These officers can be present during acceptance and trials of all materials, firing trials of the rifles, and checking of finished rifles, without interference into technical and administrative affairs”. This was one of the first cases where a Russian military acceptance commision worked abroad.
It is important to add that the Russian commission was not only tasked with completion of acceptance of finished production, but also industrial espionage and purchase of any necessary foreign equipment for Russian factories. For example, Colonel N.A. Sokerin right after his arrival in France in the spring of 1892 naked the director of the Saint-Étienne arsenal to review the possibility of buying barrel cutting machines for Russian arms factories. The French replied positively and proposed the purchase of 50 machines at the cost of 2000 francs (850 rubles) each. By mid-summer of 1893, the machines with “manifests, photographs, blueprints, and documents” were prepared for shipment to Russia and after payment was made, transported to Tula and Izhevsk.
The Russian commission in Châtellerault worked from 1892 to 1895, accepting between 500 and 1.5 thousand rifles per shift. It also covered the acceptance of ammunition and packaging produced in France. In the initial stages of production, the rejection rate of 1-4% was considered acceptable.
After accepting over 500,000 rifles in 1892-1895, the Russian agents destroyed the technical documentation and tooling, moving production entirely to domestic factories. The Russian order helped Châtellerault weather a crisis and even increase its workforce from 2000 to 6000 personnel. The Russian Emperor Nikolai II gifted Châtellerault a bell produced in St Petersburg as a sign of his gratitude. The bell was blessed and named Alexandre Nikolas, although it is also known as the “Russian bell”. It is known that in 1919 it rang to welcome home the men of the 32nd Infantry Regiment of the French Army and in 1944 to celebrate the liberation of the city from Nazi occupation.
The GAU Artillery Committee organized acceptance of Mosin rifles at the Officers’ Marksmanship School in Oranienbaum in June of 1895. 10 rifles were taken from each Russian factory (Sestroretsk, Tula, Izhevsk) as well as Châtellerault. Inspection before shooting showed that “in most Châtellerault rifles and some Sestroretsk an Tula rifles, it is tough to load ammunition from clips”. Calibration, evaluation of the lifespan of various parts as well as their compatibility followed. No issues were observed with precision and accuracy of fire. Izhevsk and Sestroretsk rifles showed a lot of wear after 100 breaking-in shots. As for interchangeability, only French rifles had any issues, namely “It was entirely impossible to install an interrupter from a Sestroretsk rifle and only possible to install an interrupter from other factories with a lot of force.” However, the GAU Artillery Committee deemed that “all rifles were quite suitable for arming troops for combat”.
In the period in question, Franco-Russian military cooperation did not end at acceptance of Mosin rifles built at Châtellerault. In late 1892 Russian factories raised the question of “inviting an experienced French master craftsman to set up production and prepare instruments for the imported barrel cutting machines purchased from French factories, as the barrels made on these machines are unsatisfactory”. The rearmament commission agreed with the arms makers’ notes and in early 1893 the Saint-Etienne factory sent its master Zh. Kollacheux “to install French barrel cutting machines”. The specialist worked in Russia for four months, earning 3200 francs (1360 rubles) for his work.
Other instances of cooperation are listed by military historian Yu.N. Leschenko. According to his research, the fine tuning of production at leading Russian defense factories, including the Tula factory, was also done under the direction of French specialists from Châtellerault.
3,904,633 three line rifles were completed by 1903. 28,875 training rifles and 1,777,805 battle rifles were produced at the Tula arms factory, 5649 training and 428,327 battle rifles at the Sestroretsk factory, 17,419 training and 1,142,969 battle rifles at the Izhevsk factory and 503,589 battle rifles (about 13% of the total) at Châtellerault.
As a result of studying the specifics of the cooperation between the Russian War Ministry and French Châtellerault arsenal in the second half of the 19th century, we can conclude that.
- Cutting edge French armament was of interest to Russian military specialists. Russia was also of interest to France as a market for its products. Military-technical contracts were signed immediately after the conclusion of the Crimean War.
- The military-political situation and condition of the Russian defense industry led to Russia placing an order for a portion of the Mosin rifles for use by the Russian army at Châtellerault in 1892-1895.
- Purchase of foreign machine tools, study of foreign weapons, production of Russian weapons at French arsenals, and trips of foreign specialists to Russian arms factories allowed for an active exchange of production experience between Russia and France. This played a positive factor for the defense of the Russian Empire.
The most large-scale and fruitful interaction between France and Russia in this area appeared in the second half of the 19th century, especially after the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance in 1891, which was the predecessor of the Entente. This publication examines the key points of military-technical cooperation between the two countries in the second half of the 19th century. using the example of the French arsenal of Châtellerault (Manufacture d’armes de Châtellerault). The article was prepared on the basis of previously unpublished archival data from the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), the Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA), the State Archive of the Tula Region (GATO), the Central State Archive of the Udmurt Republic (TsGA UR), the Archive of the Zlatoust City District (ZGO Archive), Archive of the Military Historical Museum of Artillery, Engineering Troops and Signal Corps (VIMAIViVS Archive), as well as other sources and literature. Advanced French weapons have long been of interest to representatives of Russian military-technical thought, especially the establishment of their production at one of the leading French military enterprises – the arsenal in Chatellerault. The city of Chatellerault since the 14th century. was one of the main arms centers in France. In 1819, by royal decree, a special state arsenal (i.e., an arms factory) was founded there. Its initial specialization was the production of edged weapons, and closer to the middle of the 19th century. and small arms. This was due to the transition of Western European countries from the percussion flintlock of small arms to its capsule (percussion) analogue. In this important military-technical area, the Russian Empire was catching up, which was primarily due to the high cost of restructuring its weapons industry for a new type of lock. In 1845, a new percussion smoothbore infantry rifle was adopted for service with the Russian army. At the same time, the conversion of previously manufactured flintlock rifles into percussion rifles began. These events led to significant changes in domestic weapons production. In 1847, the Tula Arms Factory was inspected by the commander of the 6th Artillery Division, Lieutenant General N. O. Sukhozanet (from the troops) and a member of the Committee for the Improvement of Fittings and Guns, Colonel B. G. Glinka. In their report to the leadership of the War Department, they pointed out “very significant defects to the detriment of the often inevitable unimportant deviations of gunsmiths in manual finishing” and petitioned “for the need to introduce mechanical devices” for the successful production of new guns with a cap lock. Members of the inspection proposed purchasing machines necessary for domestic weapons production from the French arsenal of Chatellerault. The inspectors also agreed on the need to organize internships for officers of the artillery department abroad “to acquire information about improvements in weapons production there, which are very useful and even necessary” [1]. In October 1847, the initiative of N. O. Sukhozanet and B. G. Glinka was continued, and at a meeting of the Military Council of the Russian Empire, a decision was made “according to the opinion of the artillery department of the Military Scientific Committee, to purchase Malbec from the French manufacturer, through the mediation of the Consul General in Paris, six artificial sharpening stones, used in Chatellerault, at 60 francs each, and then subject them to testing in our arms factories”[2]. The implementation of this event was entrusted to the head of the Russian mission in Paris N.D. Kiselyov. At the end of 1847, he reported to the Russian capital that the purchase of the specified property would have to be postponed until a later date, since “one of the artificial sharpenings used in Chatellerault burst, which is being investigated and means are being invented to prevent such an incident” [3 ] . The French Revolution of 1848 prevented Russia from purchasing grinders from the Chatellerault factory.
Nicholas I negatively perceived the French events of the “Spring of Nations”, diplomatic relations were broken: the French ambassador left St. Petersburg, while the Russian Ambassador N. D. Kiselyov remained in Paris as a private citizen. The Military Council decided to cancel the order for grinders in France. Despite the obvious cooling of relations between the two countries due to the rise of Emperor Napoleon III to power in France, as well as the dispute over the “Eastern Question”, which resulted in the Crimean War (1853-1856), Russia’s interest in French weapons did not subside. Thus, at the very height of the war in July 1855, near Sevastopol, Russian troops captured a sample of the French Thouvenin rifle, “with which all non-commissioned officers in the Zouave regiments were armed.” This copy was transferred to the model workshop of the Tula Arms Plant and was subjected to detailed study [4]. Immediately after the end of the war, Russian military agents arrived in France with the goal of “studying the structure of arms factories, their production, arming troops with handguns and training soldiers in shooting.” They visited factories in Saint-Etienne, Mützich, Thulle, Chatellerault, as well as the Vincennes Rifle School, where Russian officers not only got acquainted with production, but also underwent a two-month internship [5]. Experts from Russia agreed that it was the French model of organizing artillery and weapons production that would be most in demand when reforming the Russian military industry after the unsuccessful Crimean War [6] . As further research shows, the principles of organizing production and military acceptance of products at Russian defense plants were based on the experience of French enterprises and at the same time took into account the Russian specifics of organizing production [7]. Not only firearms, but also edged weapons produced at French enterprises were studied. At the end of 1857, in accordance with the order of Emperor Alexander II, the headquarters of the Feldzeichmeister General purchased two copies of “cuirasses, broadswords, cavalry and dragoon sabers, cutlasses and pikes, made of cast steel at the French arms factory in Chatellerault, […] for comparison these with weapons manufactured in our factories.” Samples of French edged weapons were transferred to the Department of Mining and Salt Affairs of the Ministry of Finance, and he, in turn, sent them to the Zlatoust arms factory, “in order to make a comparative test with weapons made at the factory from cast steel by Colonel Obukhov” [8]. Only in the spring of 1858 were samples of French bladed weapons manufactured at the Chatellerault factory delivered to Zlatoust. This delay was caused by waiting for the start of river navigation, after which the weapons were delivered to the Urals “along with the transport of medicines.” In May 1858, the gunsmiths of Zlatoust began comparative tests of products from the two countries [9]. The pilot tests included both established and enhanced samples. The first included: standard deflection, “hitting the side of a wooden cone with force,” “cutting dry hard wood with three blows.” The reinforced test consisted of “bending on an Austrian machine and cutting an iron strip 2 lines thick” (0.5 cm). The test of the cuirass consisted of “shots from soldiers’ rifles at a distance of 20 fathoms” (42 m). At the same time, it was decided to reduce the distance to 10 fathoms (21 m), since domestically produced cuirasses easily withstood the standard test, therefore, it was also surmountable for French samples [10]. According to the test results, it was revealed that edged weapons of both Chatellerault and and Zlatoust withstands all established and enhanced tests with minor deviations and is not inferior to each other in its qualities. This was largely achieved through the introduction into domestic production of a new method for producing high-quality cast steel, which was proposed by the famous metallurgist and manager of the Zlatoust factory P. M. Obukhov[11]. In turn, France showed interest in military-technical cooperation with Russia and considered it as a potential market for its military products. Thus, in 1859, the Chatellerault factory, represented by its representative Enthoven, offered its services to the Russian government as a “supplier of pistols for officers of the 1st Army.” It is worth noting that this proposal was seriously considered by the Russian military department, but did not subsequently find adequate support[12]. As you can see, the history of interaction between the Russian War Ministry and the French arsenal of Chatellerault had deep roots, so the next appeal to the enterprise of the Third Republic was quite natural. As is known, in the stubborn competitive struggle that unfolded in 1890-1891. between the Belgian L. Nagan and the Russian inventor S.I. Mosin, the right to put into service the Russian army was given to a model of small arms of a Russian designer. In April 1891, the Mosin rifle was adopted for service in Russia[13].
The current political situation at that time contributed to the adoption at a meeting chaired by Minister of War P. S. Vannovsky of a decision to place an order for the production of just over 500 thousand copies of this rifle in France[14]. Of course, none of the Russian military specialists doubted that the main burden of re-equipping the Russian army should fall on the shoulders of Russian factories. However, as part of the development of new production, the manufacture of rifles at a foreign enterprise was of great industrial interest. In a memo dated August 23, 1890, that is, even before the 1891 model rifle was put into service, P. S. Vannovsky reported to Emperor Alexander III that “at the current exchange rate of our ruble, these rifles will cost no more than if they were manufactured at our weapons factories, and that the draft contract itself guarantees our interests”[15]. This decision also had a political background, since in 1891 a Franco-Russian military alliance was concluded, and the order of the newest Russian rifle in France became its visible embodiment. This circumstance was pointed out in his memoirs by the assistant to the head of the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU), Lieutenant General P. A. Kryzhanovsky, who was directly involved in the work of the commission on the rearmament of the Russian army with a rifle of the 1891 model.[16] At the same time, the French side, represented by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Ribot, guaranteed priority order for the execution of the Russian order in Chatellerault[17]. The contract for the production of 3-line rifles at the Chatellerault plant was signed on December 19, 1891 between the French contractor A. Treil and Russian representatives Lieutenant General N. I. Chagin (member of the Artillery Committee of the GAU) and Baron L. A. Fredericks (Russian military agent in France). According to it, the contractor committed to produce 500 thousand Russian rifles within 37 months at a price of 59 francs per piece (25 rubles)[18]. In addition to Chatellerault, other French companies were also involved in fulfilling the order for the production of Mosin rifles. Thus, the production of cartridges for shooting was entrusted to the company Zhevelo, boxes and closures for guns – to the Le Marchand office, tools and accessories – to the Bruno-Hofmark plant. The delivery of finished products was carried out by the French maritime agency Dodiardi from the Chatellerault plant by rail to the port of Dunkirchen and then by sea to Revel. As Baron L.A. Fredericks reported, “this agency has previously proven itself to be very good”[19]. The acceptance of rifles manufactured in Chatellerault was the responsibility of members of a specially created commission, whose work was assigned to be assisted by a Russian military agent in France. Its members were experienced weapons specialists: Colonel N. A. Sokerin (chairman), Captain I. A. Savostyanov, staff captains Prince A. G. Gagarin, V. I. Giber von Greifendels and A. I. Kholodovsky [20 ]. According to the terms of the contract, “Russian artillery officers were allowed into the plant during the execution of the order. These officers could be present when receiving and testing all materials, testing guns by shooting and checking finished guns, without interfering, however, with the technical and administrative part of the production”[21]. It is noteworthy that this was one of the first cases when Russian military receivers had to carry out their activities abroad. It is important to note that the Russian selection committee was tasked not only with accepting manufactured products, but also with purchasing the necessary foreign equipment for domestic arms factories. For example, Colonel N.A. Sokerin, who arrived in France in the spring of 1892, immediately asked the director of the Saint-Etienne arms factory, Colonel Persen, to consider the possibility of purchasing barrel-cutting machines for Russian arms factories. The French responded positively to the Russian request, offering to buy 50 machines at a price of 2 thousand francs (850 rubles) for each unit. By mid-summer 1893, the machines “with a description of the closure, photographs, drawings and statements” were prepared for shipment to Russia, and after making the necessary payment, their transportation to Tula and Izhevsk began [22]. Functioned in Chatellerault in 1892-1895. The Russian selection committee accepted from 0.5 to 1.5 thousand rifles per work shift. Its competence also included the acceptance of cartridges and closures manufactured in France. It is worth noting that already at the initial stage of rifle production, the percentage of detected defects fell within the acceptable 1-4%23. Having accepted in 1892-1895. more than 500 thousand three-rulers produced in France, the Russian side, having destroyed technical documentation, patterns and equipment, transferred their further production to domestic enterprises. The fulfillment of the Russian order helped the Chatellerault enterprise survive the crisis and even increase the number of people working there from 2 to 6 thousand people[24].
Russian Emperor Nicholas II, as a token of gratitude to the French gunsmiths, presented the city of Chatellerault with a bell made in St. Petersburg, which after consecration received the name “Alexandre Nikolas” (its second name is “Russian bell”). It is known that in 1919 he rang in honor of the ranks of the 32nd Infantry Regiment of the French Army who returned from the front, and in 1944 in honor of the liberation of the city from fascist occupation[25]. In June 1895, in Oranienbaum, at the training ground of the Officer Rifle School, the GAU Artillery Committee organized tests of Mosin rifles manufactured by that time. 10 weapons were taken from each Russian plant (Sestroretsk, Tula, Izhevsk) and the French arsenal of Chatellerault. When “inspecting the rifles before shooting, it was noticed that in most rifles from the Chatellerault factory and in some rifles from the Sestroretsk and Imperial Tula factories, there was a tight release of cartridges from the clips into the magazine.” Next, shooting was carried out, the survivability of the parts and their interchangeability were assessed. During the tests, no questions arose about the accuracy of the battle, at the same time, the rifles of the Izhevsk and Sestroretsk arms factories showed greater wear of parts after firing 100 rounds of ammunition each. Regarding the interchangeability of products, some problems arose only with French-made rifles, namely: “it was completely impossible to insert a cut-off reflector from a rifle from the Sestroretsk plant” into them, and from samples from other factories – “only with great effort.” And yet, based on the test results, the GAU Artillery Committee “recognized that all rifles are quite suitable for combat armament of troops”[26]. During the period under review, Russian-French military-technical cooperation was not limited only to the military acceptance of Mosin rifles produced at the French Chatellerault plant. At the end of 1892, Russian arms factories raised the question of “dispatching an experienced French craftsman to install the work and prepare tools for the sent barrel-cutting machines purchased from French arms factories, due to the fact that the barrels cut on these machines do not meet the conditions of acceptance, and the trellis does not cut the trunks satisfactorily.” The Executive Commission for the rearmament of the army agreed with the arguments of the gunsmiths, and at the request of Russia, at the beginning of 1893, the French plant in Saint-Etienne sent its master, J. Collacho, to Tula and Izhevsk “to install the work of French barrel-cutting machines.” This specialist worked under a contract at Russian arms factories for four months, receiving 3.2 thousand francs (1.36 thousand rubles) for his work[27]. Military historian Yu. N. Leshchenko also points to similar facts of cooperation. According to him, the establishment of production of Mosin rifles at leading Russian defense enterprises, including the Tula Arms Plant, also took place under the direct supervision of French specialists from the Chatellerault Arsenal [28]. By 1903, a total of 3,904,633 three-line rifles were manufactured[29], of which: 28,875 training and 1,777,805 combat rifles were produced at the Tula Arms Plant, 5,649 training and 428,327 combat rifles at the Sestroretsk Arms Plant, 17,419 training and 1,142,969 combat rifles – at the Izhevsk Arms Plant, 503,589 combat rifles (about 13%) – at the French arsenal of Chatellerault [30] . Thus, as a result of studying the peculiarities of interaction between the Russian Ministry of War and the French arsenal of Chatellerault in the second half of the 19th century. the following conclusions can be drawn:
- Advanced French weapons have long been of interest to representatives of Russian military-technical thought. At the same time, Russia was also interested in leading French defense enterprises as a market for their products. Military-technical contacts between the countries intensified immediately after the end of the Crimean War of 1853-1856.
- The military-political situation and the state of the Russian military industry became the reasons for placing an order for the production of part of the Mosin rifles required for the Russian army at the French arsenal of Chatellerault in 1892-1895.
- The purchase of foreign production machines, the study of foreign weapons, the production of Russian military orders at a foreign enterprise, as well as business trips of foreign specialists to Russian arms factories contributed to the active exchange of scientific, technical and production-technological experience between Russia and France. This factor had a positive impact on strengthening the defense capability of the Russian state.